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BUFFALO- LAW REVIEW
meihods at radically different results,, where their difference in purpose is not
sufficient to explain or justify the disparity.
It would seem desirable that if a mechanism must have two pendulums, at
least they should operate in phase.
Walter I. Barrett
THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE SALE OF A PATENT
The tax treatment to be accorded the transfer of patents is an area in the
field of federal income taxation which has given rise to perplexing problems and
persistent litigation. As is the case in any transfer of assets today, the transferor
of rights to a patent naturally seeks to avail himself of capital gain benefits. How-
ever, in any situation other than the ideal, the transferor of a patent now has many
intricate and uncertain problems facing him. The source of much of this difficulty
is first, the limited scope of the present statutory scheme which requires those
outside its narrow, complicated mandate to seek relief under the law evolved
prior to its enactment, and second, because in applying this latter law, one must
contend with a questionable ruling of the Commissioner which is contrary both
to expressed legislative policy and to the economic realities surrounding the
transfer of a patent. The first phase of this comment shall consist of a discussion
of the law as it developed prior to the 1954 Code and the second phase shall
discuss the 1954 Code in light of recently adopted regulations.
THE LAw PRIOR To THE 1954 CODE
Prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code, the taxpayer had several serious
hurdles to overcome before he could obtain capital gain benefits: (1) Was the
patent a capital asset, or a section 117(j) asset, held for more than six months?
(2) Was there a sale or exchange? (3) Would the contention of the Commis-
sioner with respect to the mode of payment defeat the sale?
Was the patent a capital asset held for more than six months?
Prior to 1942, in order for a patent to be treated as a capital asset, it could
not be depreciable property used in the taxpayer's trade or business, stock in
trade or inventorial property, or property held primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of the taxpayer's business.' In other words, the taxpayer had
to show that he was not a professional inventor or, if an investor, that he was not
a dealer in inventions. An analysis of the cases deciding this factual question
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §117(a), 56 STAT. 50 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954.
§1221).
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indicates a certain liberality in finding an amateur status provided the inventor
was dearly not in the business of making and marketing inventions. For example,
the presence of the following circumstances did not affect the taxpayer's amateur
standing: the intermittent and irregular nature of inventive activities;2 prior
transactions with a business in which the taxpayer had a proprietary interest;3
a single sale notwithstanding other activity such as obtaining patents or giving
licenses;4 and finally even the fact that the inventor was a professional in one
field did not affect the sale of an invention in another.5
Subsequent to 1942, it is at least arguable that although the taxpayer might
be in the business of inventing, i.e., the patent was depreciable property used in
his trade or business, he still could achieve capital gain benefits if he was not in
the business of marketing such inventions to customers and they did not constitute
inventorial property.6 By virtue of section 117(j) ,7 the property could be con-
sidered a "quasi-capital" asset.
Although the patent was deemed a capital, or quasi-capital asset, the taxpayer
still had to meet the six month holding period requirement. There is no doubt
that the earliest point from which the holding period could be computed was the
date of "actual reduction to practice."s However the determination of when the
patent was actually reduced to practice was far from elemental. At first the cases
and the Treasury took the position that actual reduction to practice occurred
when the first successful test was completed.9 Subsequent cases have held that
completed drawings or notes sufficient to make manufacture possible would be
denominated actual reduction to practice.10 The final note of confusion was added
in 1957 when the Commissioner, in his regulations promulgated under section
1235 of the 1954 Code, announced that actual reduction to practice might occur
before or after application for a patent "but cannot occur later than the earliest
time that commercial exploitatiori of the invention occurs.""
2. Harold F. Silver, 15 T.C.M. 489 (1956); Evans v. Kavanagh, 86 F. Supp.
535 (E.D. Mich. 1949), aff'd, 188 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1951); cf. Leo M. Harvey,
6 T.C.M. 312 (1947); Margaret F. Lockhart, 16 T.C.M. 474 (1957).
3. Harold F. Silver, supra note 2; Kronner v. United States, 110 F. Supp.
730 (Ct. Cl. 1953); of. Harold T. Avery, 47 B.T.A. 538 (1942); Leo M. Harvey,
&upra note 2.
4. Beach v. Shaughnessy, 126 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. N.Y. 1954); Kronner v.
United States, supra note 3.
5. First National Bank of Princeton v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 818(D. C. N.J. 1955).
6. Margaret F. Lockhart, supra note 2; Lester P. Barlow, 2 T.C.M. 133
(1943).
7. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §117(j), added by 56 STAT. 798 (1942), (now INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §1231).
8. Samuel E. Diescher, 36 B.T.A. 732 (1937); GCM 21507, 1939-2 CUM. BULL.
189 (1939).
9. Lester P. Barlow, supra note 6; see note 8 supra.
10. Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946); Arthur C. Cope, 12 T.C.M. 525
11. U.S. Treas. Reg. §1.1235-2(e) (1957).(1953).
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Having determined that the patent was a capital, or quasi-capital asset held
for more than six months, it remained for the taxpayer to fulfill the sale or
exchange requirement.
Was there a sale or exchange of all substantial rights to the patent?
In order to qualify a transaction as a sale or exchange, the taxpayer had to
transfer all substantial rights to the property. Thus the problem was what
constituted a transfer of all substantial rights to a patent, or, put another way,
what rights could the transferor retain without the transaction being deemed
inconsistent with the passage of ownership.
An important guide to the solution of this question was the case of Water-
ma; v. Mackenzie.12 There, in a patent infringement setting and concerning the
right of a transferee of a patent to maintain such an action, the Court discussed
four significant points relevant to our problem: (1) that the form of the tran-
saction was not controlling but rather its legal effect should be scrutinized; (2)
that to constitute a sale, the transferor must convey exclusive rights to make, use
and sell the invention; (3) that the exclusive right to make, use and sell might
be limited to a specific geographical area; and (4) that an undivided interest in
the invention could be conveyed.
The courts *have had no trouble with the form v. substance distinction in
certain areas,1 3 but when called upon to consider whether the exclusive right to
make, use and sell has been transferred, some difficulty has been encountered.
In three cases, for example, the omission, from the grant, of the right to use
resulted in the transaction being termed a license.14 However most courts have
taken the view that from other circumstances surrounding the transfer a right
to use could be implied or, in other words, literal adherence to the Waterman
doctrine was unnecessary.1 5 Thus the transfer of "all right, title and interest"
would not preclude a sale.";
In any event, it may be said that, regardless of form, what was necessary to
give a transfer the legal indicia of a sale was the passage of ownership and, in the
12. 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
13. E.g., the courts have consistently held that titling the agreement a
license is not controlling. Watson v. United States, 222 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1955);
Kronner v. United States, supra note 3; Herbert Allen, 11 T.C.M. 1093 (1952).
14. Broderick v. Neale, 201 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1953); Lynne Gregg 18 T.C.
291 (1952), aff'd, 190 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1953); Cleveland Graphite Bronze Company,
10 T.C. 974 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1949).
15. Rollman v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1957), reversing, 25 T.C.
481 (1955); Rose Marie Reid, 26 T.C. 622 (1956); in Lawrence v. United States,
242 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1957), no rights to sell were transferred but the court held
that since the parties did not consider rights to sell substantial, a sale of all
substantial rights actually occurred.
16. Harold F. Silver, supra note 2; Herbert Allen, supra note 13.
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case of patents, ownership meant the exclusive right to make, use and sell or
whatever words would indicate the intent to grant to the transferee the same
monopolistic rights theretofore held by the transferor.
If inventors or investors were concerned only with transferring every right
they had to a patent, without qualification or protection, the transaction could be
carried out with comparative facility. But economic realities invariably compli-
cated the matter.
Often the transferor desired to limit the rights granted to a specific geographi-
cal area. Since the Waterman doctrine permitted such a limitation, the courts have
respected such provisions in an agreement, if exclusive rights to make, use and
sell in that area were transferred.1 7 A complication arose however when a tran-
saction limited the rights conveyed to a particular industry. In United States v.
Carruthers18 the agreement restricted the grant to the tuna industry. The court
reasoned that since a sale of patent rights could be limited to a specific area, there
was no reason why it could not be limited to a specific industry. Realizing the
presence of the requirement that all rights in an area must be granted, the court
proceeded to discern that the invention in question had only speculative value in
other than the tuna industry. Therefore it determined that all substantial rights
in the patent had actually been transferred.10
Certain problems were raised when the transferor retained a right to use the
patent. At first glance such a retention would seem inconsonant with Waterman.
However if the use was not competitive with the transferee's rights, it was not
an unreasonable extension of Waterman to hold that the reservation was of an
undivided interest in the patent rights,20 or was merely a license back by the
transferee of a limited right to use.21 It is submitted that this view is correct only
if the patent is capable of being dearly segregated into uses none of which will
affect the monopoly of the transferee.
Recognizing not only the desire of the assignor and assignee to protect
their interests, but also the risks involved in a sale of a patent, the courts have
generally allowed a limited retention of rights in the form of security interests
or conditions subsequent. Thus it has been held that the assignor may terminate
the agreement if the assignee defaults in payments,2 2 becomes bankrupt2 3 fails
17. Vincent A. Marco, 25 T.C. 544 (1956); Watson v. United States, supra
note 13.
18. 219 F.2d (9th Cir. 1955).
19. Accord, First National Bank of Princeton v. United States, supra note 5;
but of. American Chemical Plant Company v. Smith, 131 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Pa.
1955).
20. Kavanagh v. Evans, 188 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1951).
21. Lamar v. Granger, 99 F.Supp. 17 (Wi). Pa. 1951); Arthur C. Ruge,
26 T.C. 138 (1956).
22. Monie S. Hudson, 15 T.C.M. 284 (1956); Edward C. Myers, supra note 10.
23. Commissioner v. Celanese Corporation, 140 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
to use his best efforts to market the invention,24 or fails to make and sell a
specified amount.2 5 In addition the assignor has been permitted to retain rights
to sue for infringement although this is questionable if the payments are not
deemed part of the purchase price,20 to restrict sub-licensing or reassignment unless
the assignee transferred the entire business,2 or to prohibit sub-licensing without
the consent of the assignor.2s On the other hand the transferee could terminate
in the event the invention proved to be worthless. 29
Although the taxpayer may have been able to surmount the aforementioned
difficulties, there remained, after 1950, one problem which seemed for all practical
purposes to preclude the accrual of capital gain benefits.
The Commissioner's position with respect to the mode of payment.
Until 1950 it was well established that if a transfer met the requirements of
the Waterman test, it would be viewed as an assignment giving rise to capital
gain treatment regardless of the mode of payment.
However in 1950, the Commissioner, by way of a ruling reciting his non-
acquiescence in the Myers case,3 took the position that, after June 1, 1950, where
the purchase price was cast in the form of payments contingent upon a fixed
percentage of the selling price of the fruits of the invention, or contingent upon
the number of units sold, or any other method based on production, use or sale,
or periodic over a period coterminous with the use of the patent, the payments
were to be considered royalties and taxable as ordinary income.31
Until this ruling, no serious question had been raised regarding the mode of
payment pursuant to an otherwise valid sale. This is explainable in part from the
fact that prior to 1950 the revenue laws did not expressly provide for the tax
treatment of patents, copyrights and other similar property. The requirements,
as hereinbefore mentioned, were that the property be a capital asset and that there
be a sale or exchange of such asset. If these tests were met, the mode of payment
24. Kronner v. United States, supra note 13.
25. Watson v. United States, supra note 13.
26. Thornton G. Graham, 26 T.C. 730 (1956); First National Bank of Prince-
ton v. United States, supra note 5; General Spring Corporation v. Commissioner,
12 T.C.M. 847 (1953); but cf. Eterpen Financiera Sociedad v. United States, 108
F.Supp. 100 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
27. Watson v. United States, supra note 13; First National Bank of Princeton
v. United States, supra note 13; Allen v. Werner 190 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1951).
28. Rollman v. Commissioner, supra note 15; Carroll Pressure Roller Cor-
poration, 28 T.C. No. 152, (September 30, 1957).
29. Lawrence v. United States, supra note 15; Monie S. Hudson, supra note
22. See also Kronner v. United States, supra note 13.
30. Edward C. Myers, supra note 10.
31. Mimeograph 6490, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 9, nullifying a previous acquiescence
in the Myers decision.
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would not limit or qualify the effect of the grant. However the Revenue Act of
1950 as originally passed by the House sought to prohibit capital gain benefits to
those whose personal effort and services had created such properties as patents,
copyrights, and similar property.32 As a presage of the special treatment to be
subsequently accorded patents, the Senate Committee with significant language33
excluded patents from the operation of sections 117(a) (1) (C) and 117(j) '
(1)(C) [now sections 1221(3) and 1231(b)(1)(C)]. Thus a policy of
fostering and giving incentive to the efforts of inventors was established. It was
true that the only realistic way to purchase a patent was not a lump sum payment
but rather to make the price contingent in some manner upon the ultimate value
of the patented property. Such value in turn could be determined only by its
commercial effectiveness. But this was true also of copyrights, and other similar
property. The property involved, in either case, was the product of personal
effort One is hard pressed to find any basis for diverse tax treatment, other than
the above policy. Therefore from a strictly consistent tax viewpoint the Com-
missioner's position may be well taken.
In this anomalous setting the Commissioner announced his ruling with
respect to contingent payments. If one presupposes the wisdom of granting
incentive to inventors solely, then the ruling is incompatible with such policy, as
well as with the legal and economic realities surrounding the transfer of a patent.
If the transfer meets the established criteria to effect the passage of ownership
then the mode of payment should not destroy the tax benefits ordinarily accom-
panying the sale of a capital asset. To so withdraw the benefits would seem
clearly incongruous with the stated policy.
In any event, the Commissioner's ruling met with a notable lack of success.
The Tax Court and other courts persistently rejected his contention. 34 In fact the
position gained support in only two cases, the first of which is of significance to
New York practitioners. In Bloch v. United States,35 a case dealing with the tax
consequences of a transfer by a non-resident alien under section 211 (a) of the
1939 Code, the court stated: 'The many substantial rights in the patent retained
by plaintiff are further indications of the failure to transfer absolute ownership for
purposes of §211 (a). But the crux of the matter seems to be the retention of an
interest in the profitable exploitation of the patented articles by receipt of a
32. H.R. 8920, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., §210 (1950).
33. "Your committee believes that the desirability of fostering the work of
such (amateur) inventors outweighs the small amount of additional revenue
which might be obtained under the House bill, and therefore the words 'inven-
tion,' 'patent,' and 'design' have been eliminated." S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess., U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS 3097-98 (1950).
34. Carl G. Dreymann, 11 T.C. 153 (1948); Kronner v. United States, supra
note 13; Vincent A. Marco, supra note 17; Arthur C. Ruge, supra note 21; Watson
v. United States, supra note 13.
35. 200 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1952).
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percentage of the sales price or a stated amount for each article sold." Furthermore
the court stated that the Waterman case was not necessarily authdrity in a tax
situation. The Bloch case has been distinguished often on the ground that it dealt
with a non-resident alien and a special section.36 Such distinction appears valid
in view of the fact that the Bloch opinion itself distinguished a prior Second
Circuit case37 in which it was held that such contingent payments to a resident
did not preclude capital gain treatment The Bloch decision should be limited to
its facts, but the quoted language was nevertheless strong support for the Treasury's
contention. 33 The second case often cited by the Commissioner as lending support
to his position is Broderick v. Neale.3 9 This case has also been distinguished many
times on the ground that the transferor did not convey the exclusive right to use
the invention and thus did not meet the Waterman test of a sale.40 Therefore
citing Bloch was unnecessary.
However unsuccessful the Commissioner may have been, he persisted in his
position and this, coupled with the other problems surrounding a transfer, led to
constant litigation and perplexity. It was in this situation of general uncertainty
that the 1954 Code was enacted, containing for the first time specific provisions
with respect to the sale of a patent
It may be well at this stage to point out that the use of the past tense in the
above discussion does not mean that the material is of only historical significance,
because much of this prior law is applicable under section 1235 of the 1954 Code
and shall control transfers falling outside its limited scope. This is perhaps the
most important consideration to be kept in mind when handling the transfer of a
patent. The recently adopted regulations explaining the operation of section 1235
dearly indicate that section 1235 is not to be the exclusive means of obtaining
capital gain benefits but that other provisions of the internal revenue law will
apply to transactions not within its purview.4 1 Thus it can be said that if a
payment is received in 1955, for example, the taxpayer would look first to section
1235. If he does not qualify under that section then, to obtain capital gain
treatment, within the meaning of the regulation that other portions of the
revenue law would apply, the taxpayer would look to section 1221. In applying
36. Vincent A. Marco, -upra note 17; United States v. Carruthers, supra
note 18; Kronner v. United States, supra note 13.
37. Commissioner v. Hopkinson, 126 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1942).
38. In a recent case the Second Circuit again had an opportunity to discuss
this question. But although the court listed the right to royalties as one retained
by the transferor, it did not consider it important in light of the "mass" of other
rights retained by the taxpayer. The court held the transaction a license without
reference to the Block decision. Watkins v. United States, 58-1 USTC 19321 (2d
Cir. 1958).
39. 201 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1953).
40. Vincent A. Marco, supra note 17; Crook v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 252
(W.D. Pa. 1955); United States v. Carruthers, supra note 18.
41. U.S. Treas. Reg. §1.1235-1(b) (1957); see Leonard Coplan, 28 T.C. No..141,
(September 20, 1957).
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this section the case law developed under the 1939 Code, i.e. section 117 (which
section 1221 reenacts), would be controlling.
With this alternative procedure in view, we proceed to the discussion of the
1954 statute.
CAPITAL GAIN AD THE 1954 CODE
The governing provision of the Internal Revenue Code relating to the sale
of a patent is section 1235. This section is applicable to payments received after
January 1, 1954, regardless of when the actual transfer was made. The focal
point of the present statutory scheme is section 1235 (a) which in essence provides
that a transfer, other than by gift, inheritance or devise, of all substantial rights
to a patent by any holder shall give rise to long-term capital gain benefits
regardless of the periodic or contingent nature of the payments. This apparently
favorable treatment would seem merely an extension of the aforementioned policy
announced in the legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1950.42
What transfers will qualify?
In order to qualify for capital gain treatment, the transfer must be of all
substantial rights to a patent or of an undivided interest therein. The newly
adopted regulations inform us that two types of transfers are dearly not transfers
of all .abstandal rights; those limited by the agreement to a period less than the
remaining life of the patent and those transfers in which there is a retention of
the right to terminate at will 4a On the other hand, and consistent with the
interpretation given transfers under the prior law, it is dear that the retention of
rights by the transferor to secure payment or performance, in a transfer granting
exclusive power to make, use and sell, or the retention of a security interest, would
not invalidate the transfer.44 Except for these specific guides, the determination of
whether the transfer is of all substantial rights must be made in light of all of the
surrounding circumstances. The question is whether the transferor has retained
rights inconsistent with the passage of ownership.45 Of particular significance in
answering this question are the cases decided under the 1939 Code, since the test
has its roots in these decisions and the legislative history of the present section
indicates the desire to retain it.46
42. See note 33 supra.
43. U.S. Treas. Reg. §1.1235-2(b) (1), (4) (1957).
44. U.S. Treas. Reg. §1.1235-2(b) (2) (1957).
45. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS 5082 (1954).46. 'It is the intention of your committee to continue this realistic test,
whereby the entire transaction, regardless of formalities, should be examined in its
factual context to determine whether or not substantially all rights of the owner
"(:S6T) C809 SMWl "(rV :Y "DNOD "S'fl
'SS Pz "Buoo PE8 'z9t "o x "a u ' ." ,sauosqnoi leqeA -u41LI ar ss 1 2uIZ!u
2o0al uueti t r x 'e9aaisuual aiR ol pas-eala uaaq eAvlr Aaadoad jualvd ai ul
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With respect to the transfer or retention of an undivided interest in the
patent, the regulations may have an impact on the prior law. In addition to
prohibiting a transfer of only the rights to income from a patent, the regulations
state that an undivided interest shall not include a license limited geographically,
or, more important, a license covering only some of the-valuable uses inherett
in the patent. 47 It is submitted that, while its meaning in this context is not
altogether dear, the provision relating to a license limited geographically is not
intended to overrule the Waterman doctrine or the cases subsequently deciding
that a transfer of exclusive rights to a whole patent could be limited, for example,
to the United States. The provision pertaining to license covering only some of
the valuable uses should be taken to mean that if a competitive use is retained by
the transferor, he has not parted with an undivided interest in the patent. On this
basis, practitioners should proceed with caution if they intend to insert into an
agreement what were formerly denominated license back clauses, particularly if
the use, in effect, retained could be equated as competitive with the rights
transferred.
While section 1235 (a) refers to the transfer of rights to a patent, the
regulations provide that it is not necessary that the patent be in existence or even
applied for and therefore the inventor can sell what is tantamount to an inchoate
interest in the patentable property.43 However it is implicit that capital gain
benefits hinge upon a patent ultimately being issued.
In the above respects, there is substantially little difference between a transfer
that qualifies under section 1235 and a transfer qualifying under the 1939 Code.
But here the similarity ends.
A further requirement for a valid transfer is set forth in subsection (d) of
section 1235, wherein it is stated that the benefits of section 1235 (a) shall not
apply to a transfer to persons "related" within section 267(b), except that
brothers and sisters are excluded from this "related" category. Apart from any
spousal, ancestral or lineal relationship, "related" significantly includes, inter alia,
a corporation in which the transferor owns more than 50 per cent in value of the
outstanding stock. For purposes of computing the percentage, stock held by
"related" persons within section 267(b) is deemed to be owned by the transferor.
It is to be noted that a proposed amendment to section 1235 (d) 49 would reduce
the prohibited percentage of ownership to 25 per cent. This amendment also
emphasizes the brother and sister exception by providing that for purposes of
47. U.S. Treas. Reg. §1235-2(c) (1957); see Rev. Rul. 57-40, I.R.B. 1957-5,
20 as to options to acquire interests in a patent.
48 U.S. Treas. Reg. §1.1235-2(a) (1957); see F. H. Philbrick, 27 T.C. 346
(1956).
49. H.R. 8381, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., §46 (1958).
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section 1235 the stock held by these collaterals shall not be considered. However
this interpretation is already acceptable under the present section."
A final significant point to be considered with respect to a transfer under
section 1235 is the mode of payment. The section expressly asserts that capital
gain treatment shall be realized regardless of whether or not the payments
received for the transfer are payable periodically over a period generally coter-
minous with the transferee's use of the patent, or are contingent on the production,
use or disposition of the property. This position signifies a disregard for the
unwavering contention of the Commissioner that such periodic or contingent
payments are the payment of royalties and taxable as ordinary income,51 and there
is no question but that this was the intent of Congress. 52 Notwithstanding this
clear expression of legislative intent, the Commissioner in 1955 reaffirmed his
position by making the prior ruling applicable to payments received between
June 1, 1950 and the effective date of the 1954 Code.53 In response to this
Congress retroactively amended the 1939 Code to incorporate therein the pro-
visions of section 1235 as section 117 (q).5 The problem however remains since
the Commissioner will undoubtedly takce this position as to any transfer not
qualifying under section 1235 or section 117 (q).
Though the transaction may otherwise qualify under section 1235(a), that
section states that the transfer must be made by a holder.
Who qualifies as a holder?
Section 1235 (b) defines two categories of individuals who are to be deemed
holders. The first category includes any individual who created the property. 55
This, contrary to pri6r law, will include professional as well as amateur inventors
but manifestly excludes entities such as corporations, trusts, or partnerships.56 The
second category includes any individual investor acquiring his interest for con-
sideration paid to the creator prior to the actual reduction to practice of the'
invention, provided such individual investor is neither the employer of the
creator or "related" to the creator within the aforementioned limitations of
50. U.S. Treas. Reg. §1.1235-2(f) (1) (1957).
51. See note 31 supra.
52. "To obviate the uncertainty caused by this mimeograph and to provide
an incentive to inventors to contribute to the welfare of the Nation, your com-
mittee intends. . . to give statutory assurance to certain patent holders that the
sale of a patent... shall not be deemed not to constitute a 'sale or exchange' for
tax purposes solely on account of the mode of payment." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CONG. & AD. NEvws 5082 (1954).
53. Rev. Rul. 55-58, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 97 (1955).
54. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §117(q), added by 70 STAT. 404 (1956).
55. The creator or "original and first" inventor as that term is used in title
35 of the United States Code. U.S. Treas. Reg. §1.1235-2(d) (1) (i) (1957).
56. The partnership canfiot be a holder but each individual member may be
qualified. U.S. Treas. Reg. §1.1235-2(d) (2) (1957).
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section 1235 (d), which applies section 267 (b). The requirements that both the
inventor and the investor be individuals and that the investor acquire his interest
before the invention is actually reduced to practice represent the major departure
from the prior law. The result is that in the great majority of transactions, the
taxpayer will have to seek relief elsewhere.
While the term holder includes only an individual inventor and an individual
investor who is not the employer of the inventor or "related" to him, this does
not mean that these holders may not transfer their rights to a non-controlled
corporation, for example, or that the inventor may not transfer his interests to his
employer. However in the latter instance, apart from the practicalities of the
situation that most inventions developed while in the employ of another become,
pursuant to the employment contract, the property of the employer, the inventor-
employee must face the difficult factual question of whether the payments were
in reality compensation for services and thus ordinary income.5T
Since section 1235 (a) expressly treats a qualifying transaction as the sale
of a capital asset held for more than six months, a holder will realize long-term
capital gain without regard to the usual holding period. Impliedly, a loss on the
transaction would result in long-term capital loss even though the section was
intended as a relief measure for the inventor.
CONCLUSION
As noted, there seems to be little practical reason for a distinction between
the tax treatment accorded a patent transfer and, for example, the transfer of a
copyright. However Congress has expressly indicated a policy to stimulate inventive
activity and therefore, after assuming the wisdom of such policy, the evaluation of
section 1235 can be confined to an analysis of its effectiveness in furthering this
policy. To its credit is allowing professional as well as .amateur inventors to
benefit, eliminating the holding period, and disregarding the Commissioner's
position with respect to contingent payments. On the other hand, the requirements
that the inventor and the investor be individuals, that the investor acquire his
interest before actual reduction to practice, and that the transfer cannot be made
-to a corporation in which the transferor owns more than 50 per cent of the value
of the outstanding stock, would all seem to militate against personal exploitation
of the patent by the inventor which in the last analysis would seem the greatest
incentive. The proposed amendment reducing the control factor to 25 per cent
would all but prohibit personal exploitation in view of the constructive ownership
provisions.
57. U.S. Treas. Reg §1.1235-1(c)(2) (1957); see, e.g., Arthur C. Ruge, aupra
note 21.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The key difficulty however is the requirement that the investor be an
individual. Subsidization of an inventor's activity would seem to be the best
means of promoting inventive activity particularly in view of the fact that an
inventor's income, before the product of his efforts is realized, may often be
meager. s Such subsidization represents a deterring risk to an individual which
could more easily be absorbed by entities desirous of fostering inventive activity
from other than charitable motives.
Be this as it may, the concrete result of the intricate mechanism of section
1235, and the alternative possibilities under the prior law, is that practitioners
must carefully evaluate the circumstances of the inventor and investor client.
While capital gain benefits may ostensibly be easier to obtain under section 1235,
the expansive possibilities of the prior law may be more advantageous.
George M. Gibson
CURRENT VIEWS ON THE TAXATION OF STOCK OPTIONS
The most effective means of compensating the corporate executive and
other valuable employees in light of our present taxing structure is a problem
which constantly commands the attention of corporate employers throughout
the country. The ideal form of compensation of course is one which provides
a maximum, non-taxable, economic benefit for the employee, and at the same
time, allows a maximum deductible expense to the employer. Since absolute
realization of this ideal is usually impossible under our present income tax code
the problem becomes one of formulating compensation plans which most nearly
approach it.
One of the most popular methods of tax-free compensation is the use of
fringe benefits. These often include such items as country club memberships,
various types of insurance benefits,' company cars, interest free loans,2 expense
accounts, and the like. In general this type of compensation is non-taxable to the
employee, and at the same time it may be fully deducted by the employer.
However, the economic benefits which may be conferred by this method are
usually not substantial, and these plans are often subject to close scrutiny by the
58. The income spreading provisions of the 1954 Code are beyond the scope
of this paper but should be consulted if there is a chance that a transaction will
not qualify for capital gain benefits.
1. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, §§105-06. These sections deal with health and
accident insurance plans and provide that, generally premiums paid by the
employer as well as most benefit payments received by the employee are exclud-
able from the employee's gross income.
2. Rev. Rul. 713, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 23. Here the Commissioner ruled that
interest free loans from the employer to the employee do not constitute taxable
income to the latter.
